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State Terrorism and Globalization
The Cases of Ethiopia and Sudan
Asafa Jalata*
ABSTRACT
This article compares the essence and effects of Ethiopian and Sudanese state terrorism
by focusing on the commonalities between the two states. These peripheral African states
have used global and regional connections and state terrorism as political tools for creating
and maintaining the confluence of identity, religion, and political power. Ethiopia
primarily depends on the West, and Sudan on the Middle East, since Christianity and Islam
are the dominant religions in these African states respectively. While the Ethiopian state
was formed by the alliance of Abyssinian (Amhara-Tigray) colonialism and European
imperialism, the Sudanese state was created by British colonialism known as the Anglo-
Egyptian condominium. Massive social and cultural destruction and violence have
produced and maintained these colonial political structures. These structures, in turn, have
racialized identities by facilitating the processes of Abyssinianization and Christianization
in Ethiopia, Arabization and Islamization in Sudan, and Africanization and marginaliza-
tion of indigenous Africans in both states. Furthermore, each state has been involved in
ethnonational cleansing, which has been disguised rhetorically as a move toward national
self-determination and democracy. Consequently, the racialization and ethnicization of
these states, external dependency, and domestic terrorism have prevented the implementa-
tion of national self-determination and the construction of legitimate multinational democ-
racies that could solve the political, social, cultural, and economic crises in Sudan and
Ethiopia.
Keywords: genocide, globalization, marginalization, massive human rights violations,
racism, religion, state terrorism
Introduction
In this article, I examine the essence of state terrorism in Ethiopia and Sudan
in regional and global contexts. From the late 19th century to the present, the
‘modern’ Ethiopian and Sudanese states have been formed, consolidated, and
maintained by state terrorism and global connections. The Ethiopian state was
created by the alliance of Abyssinian (Amhara-Tigray) dependent colonialism
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and European imperialism, and the Sudanese state by British colonialism
known as the Anglo-Egyptian condominium. In both Sudan and Ethiopia,
colonial political structures dominated by persons claiming Semitic descent
emerged through a strategy of massive social and cultural destruction and politi-
cal violence. Although Christianity is the main ideology of the Ethiopian state
and Islam is the principal ideology of the Sudanese state, the elites and societies
that have dominated the political structures in both countries share a strategy
of racializing their own identities and those of indigenous Africans to African-
ize and marginalize indigenous population groups and facilitate the process of
Abyssinianization and Christianization in Ethiopia and Arabization and
Islamization in Sudan. In addition, just as successive Ethiopian state elites have
maintained their legitimacy and survival through external connections and
domestic political terrorism, the Sudanese state elites that emerged through the
process of decolonization in the mid-20th century have depended on external
connections and terrorism for their legitimacy and survival.
First, I provide historical background to the processes of state forma-
tion in the two countries. Second, I explore the global, regional, and local
processes through which the modern Ethiopian and Sudanese states emerged.
Specifically, I demonstrate how global connections and state terrorism have
been used as political tools for creating and maintaining the confluence of
identity, religion, and political power; in other words, I examine the connection
between terrorism, globalism, and the process of racialization and ethnicization
of state power. Third, I explore state terrorism in Ethiopia and Sudan and
conclude that in these two countries there can be no multicultural or multi-
national democracy, peace, stability, or development without removing the
conditions that have facilitated external dependency and domestic terrorism.
Historical Background
Since ancient times, repeated episodes of migration from Arabia have led to a
series of conflicts revolving around issues of religion, identity, land, and power
between indigenous African population groups and the Africanized Arab
descendants in the countries that today are called Ethiopia and Sudan. The
modern ideology of the Ethiopian state evolved from what was once the
Axumite Kingdom of Abyssinia, which Africanized descendants of Arab settlers
formed in the first century AD (Michels, 1991). The Axumite Kingdom accepted
Orthodox Christianity in the fourth century through the commercial relation-
ship it developed with the Greco-Romans. However, Muslim Arab immigrants
who arrived after the rise of Islam in the seventh century subsequently chal-
lenged the Axumites and spread this new religion throughout African coastal
towns. As Islamic influence increased, the commerce of the Axumite Kingdom
started to decline. In the mid-11th century, the previously colonized Agao
people established a kingdom known as the Zagwe Dynasty by overthrowing
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the Axumite Kingdom. This dynasty lasted until 1270, when it was overthrown
by one of the groups that descended from the remnants of the Axumites. These
Axumite descendants developed a separate identity known as Amhara.
The Amhara ethnonational group and another group known as Tigray
are collectively called Habashas or Abyssinians. The Habashas developed a
common religion, tradition, and set of customs, but the Amhara and Tigray have
maintained different languages. Although phenotypically and culturally
Africanized, the Habashas have suppressed their Africanness by linking them-
selves to the Middle East and by considering themselves racially and culturally
superior to indigenous Africans (Jalata, 2001). Using their state power, the
Habashas imposed their Christian religion, their languages – Amharic or
Tigragna – and their customs on the peoples they colonized, resulting in
Abyssinianization, which I have described as the complete destruction of the
identity of the colonized population groups by claiming racial and/or cultural
superiority (Jalata, 1993).
Arab immigrants and their Africanized descendants also culturally,
politically, and religiously marked the country known as Sudan, the northern
part of which was once the famous indigenous kingdom of Nubia. Nubians had
trade connections with the Arabs before the emergence of Islam, and with the
decline of the Nubian civilization and the division of its kingdom, the number
of Muslim Arab immigrants increased in Nubia. A signed treaty with Arabs who
colonized Egypt in AD 640 led to the peaceful migration of more Arabs into
Nubia, who gradually colonized the kingdom. There were four immigration
waves from Arabia to this region: immigration through Egypt in the seventh and
eighth centuries (MacMichael, 1967), immigration through Abyssinia in the
eighth century, a third immigration wave in the 13th and 14th centuries
(MacMichael, 1967), and a fourth immigration wave following the emergence of
the Funj Kingdom.
The Funj Kingdom was founded in AD 1504 by the descendants of Arab
immigrants who overthrew the Kingdom of Christian Nubia (Adams, 1977). For
the Arab immigrants and their descendants, the Funj Kingdom ‘became a
guarantee of peace and order’ (Adams, 1977: 14), but for the original Africans,
it became the tool of destruction. Most Nubians remained Christian until the
15th or 16th century, when the newcomers introduced their system of racialized
politics and religion. Between 1504 and 1820, the kingdom ‘institutionalized
Islam and it developed into the official religion’ (Ibrahim, 1979: 8). Generally
speaking, Arab immigrants and their Africanized descendants developed racial-
ized identities and introduced to the Horn of Africa politicized religions,
Orthodox Christianity and Islam, which proved to be problematic for the
construction of legitimate and multicultural democratic societies. The original
Africans, in particular, were negatively affected by Abyssinianization and
Christianization and by Arabization and Islamization, respectively, in the areas
that later emerged as Abyssinia/Ethiopia and Sudan.
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Indigenous Africans had various social and cultural formations. Differ-
ent ethnonational communities had varying forms of state formation processes,
including kingdoms, democracies, and lineage and kinship political systems. The
Oromo were one of the peoples that practiced an indigenous popular demo-
cratic system called Gada, or Oromo democracy (Legesse, 1973, 2000).1
American anthropologist Bonnie Holcomb (1991: 1–10) notes that the Gada
system ‘organized the Oromo people in an all-encompassing democratic
republic even before the few European pilgrims arrived from England on the
shores of North America and only later built a democracy.’ Each indigenous
society fought but failed to protect its homeland and people from the invaders.
Over the last five centuries, conflicts and wars having international dimensions
have been frequently recorded in the Horn of Africa (Jalata, 1993). The Arabs
and the Ottoman Empire dominated the commercial activities of the Horn until
European imperialism expanded to the region.
This capitalist penetration laid the foundations for the modern
Ethiopian and Sudanese states. Oromia (the Oromo country) was partitioned
between Britain and Ethiopia; Somaliland was divided among Britain, France,
Italy, and Abyssinia; Sudan was occupied by Britain; and the Afar country was
partitioned between France, Italy, and Abyssinia. While other Africans were
denied the opportunity to buy firearms on suspicion that they would be used
against Europeans, because of their collaboration with the European imperial-
ists and because of their Christian religion, the Habasha (Ethiopian) rulers were
allowed to buy firearms and participate in the Scramble for Africa (Beachey,
1962). The modern Ethiopian state emerged from the alliance of Ethiopian colo-
nialism and European imperialism, while the modern Sudanese state developed
after the decolonization of Sudan in 1956.
The Emergence of the Modern Ethiopian and Sudanese States
The practice of creating and supporting a neocolonial state in accordance with the
interests of the racialized capitalist world system started with the emergence of the
modern Ethiopian state in Africa (Jalata, 1993, 2001). Because of their Christian
ideology and the willingness to collaborate with European imperialist powers,
successive Habasha rulers received access to European technology, weapons,
administrative and military expertise, and other skills needed for the construction
of the modern state (Holcomb and Ibssa, 1990; Jalata, 1993). Consequently,
Ethiopian warlords participated in the scramble for Africa. The main reason for
this colonial expansion was to obtain commodities such as gold, ivory, coffee,
musk, hides and skins, slaves, and land. The emerging Ethiopian state committed
genocide on peoples such as the Oromo to obtain these materials. Between 1868
and 1900, when Oromia was effectively colonized by Abyssinia, the Menelik forces
reduced the Oromo population from 10 to 5 million; war, slavery, famine, and
diseases contributed to the destruction of the Oromo people (Bulatovich, 2000;
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Jalata, 1993), but we do not know how many Somali,Afar, Sidama, and others were
decimated during this colonial occupation. The Haile Selassie, Mengistu and Meles
regimes have continued these genocidal practices (Jalata, 1993).
The racialized/ethnicized modern state of Sudan also developed from
the expansion of the European-dominated capitalist world economy in the form
of British colonization. When, in the mid-1950s, various Sudanese political
forces demanded their rights of national self-determination, the British colonial
government announced its intention to decolonize Sudan. Since the British
relinquished power, successive racialized/ethnicized Sudanese regimes – civil or
military – have imposed their political authority through repression and terror-
ism to possess absolute control over the means of compulsion (the state) and
the means of consumption (productive resources). As Besteman (1999: 129)
explains:
global racial categories elaborated during the colonial period reinforced preex-
isting local ethnic construction, ensuring a national hierarchization of ethnici-
ties and their accompanying privileges, statuses, rights, and meaning within the
political community condensed into being by postcolonial state power.
European colonialism and the imperial interstate system have created
and consolidated racialized/ethnicized states or ‘authoritarian-terrorist’ regimes
in both countries. Each has been viewed as an authoritarian regime by the
respective ethnonation from which it emerged and as terrorist by the racialized
political minorities it suppresses and exploits. These authoritarian-terrorist
regimes are characterized by extreme militarization and repression; tight
control of information and resources in the form of foreign aid, domestic finan-
cial resources, and political appointments; and direct ownership and control of
all aspects of state power, including security and military institutions, judiciary
and other public bodies, and financial institutions (Besteman, 1999; Jalata, 2000).
As the Ethiopian state has been Abyssinianized and Christianized to exclude
non-Habashas from decision-making power, the Sudanese state has been
Islamized and Arabized to exclude indigenous Africans from state power. These
authoritarian-terrorist regimes have been supported by powerful global or
regional powers and the imperial interstate system.
The Discourse of Racism, Ethiopian State Terrorism, and Global Tyranny
State terrorism is a systematic governmental policy in which massive violence is
practiced against a given population group with the goal of eliminating any
behavior that promotes political struggle or resistance by members of that
group. Any state that engages in terrorism is not a protector of citizens; rather,
it violates civil and human rights through assassinations, mass killings, and
imprisonments, often along with a display of corpses in the streets so that
the remaining population will accept the violent state out of terror and
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intimidation. The main assumption of such a state is that it can control the popu-
lation by destroying its leaders and the culture of resistance. States that fail to
establish hegemony by accountable democratic political order are unstable and
insecure; hence, they engage in state terrorism (Oliverio, 1997).
Successive Ethiopian authoritarian-terrorist regimes have used the
discourses of race, culture, and Christianity to link themselves to the Middle
East, Europe, and North America and to consolidate their power against fellow
Ethiopians and the colonized populations, such as the Oromo, Sidama, Ogaden-
Somali, and Walayita. Habashas have effectively used racism, which combines
the discourses of biological and cultural differences to justify unequal treatment
of different population groups, to destroy or suppress colonized peoples (Jalata,
2001). Globally, the Habashas have used Semitic and Christian discourses to
mobilize assistance from Jews, Arabs, Europeans, and Americans who see
Habashas closer to themselves than the peoples whom they consider ‘real black’
(Jalata, 2001) and consider them closer to ‘the European race’ or members of
‘the great Caucasian family’ (quoted in Marcus, 1996: 5).2
Ancient Ethiopia was the name of the black world as a whole. Because
most people do not know the difference between ancient Ethiopia and contem-
porary Ethiopia, the Habashas have been able to use their blackness to mobilize
other Africans, the African diaspora (Scott, 1993), and black US policy elites
against the Oromo and other colonized peoples (Jalata, 2001). Recognizing the
political significance of the name Ethiopia, the Abyssinians officially adopted
the name in the 1930s, although they developed a racialized identity that differ-
entiated them from the original Africans whom they saw as real blacks. Because
the Habashas maintained formal political power, Africans who were colonized
and enslaved by Europeans wrongly considered contemporary Ethiopia as an
island of black freedom. Most blacks ‘knew very little about the social and politi-
cal conditions of Ethiopia. What they wrote or said about Ethiopia was at best
a manifestation of their emotional state’ (Scott, 1993: 26). Other Africans were
unaware that Ethiopia’s political power came from allying with the colonizing
European powers.
In reality, the Ethiopia that participated in the slave trade and the
Scramble for Africa was not an island of black freedom but a ‘prison house’ in
which colonized and enslaved peoples were and still are brutalized. Even though
Habashas are black, they present themselves as Semitic to associate themselves
with the Middle East and dissociate themselves from Africa, whose peoples they
consider both racially and culturally inferior. Sorenson (1993: 29) expresses this
racist attitude as ‘a multiplicity of Ethiopians, blacks who are whites, the quintes-
sential Africans who reject African identity.’ Since the concept of race is a sociopo-
litical construct, it is essential to critically understand the historical context in
which Ethiopian racism is produced and reproduced to denigrate colonized
peoples and to deny them access to Ethiopian state power by practicing state
terrorism. In Ethiopian discourse, so-called racial distinctions such as Semitic,
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Hamitic, Negroid, and Cushitic are manipulated to perpetuate the political objec-
tive of Habasha domination of the colonized population groups. Habasha elites
have recognized the importance of racial distinctions and used the discourse of
racism to mobilize support for their political projects (Sorenson, 1998).
Ethiopian racism and white racism have conveniently intermarried in
US policy formulation and implementation in Ethiopia. When policy issues are
discussed, ideologies such as Semitic civility, Christianity, and the patriotism of
Amharas and Tigrayans are used to valorize and legitimize Habasha dominance
and power. Moreover, the façade of barbarism, backwardness, and destructive-
ness of the Oromo and other indigenous Africans is reinvented to deny them
access to state power (Jalata, 2001). The Ethiopian government has historically
obtained its political legitimacy and financed its engagement in human rights
violations through global connections. Just as Britain supported Ethiopia during
the first half of the 20th century, the United States provided financial assistance
to the Haile Selassie government from the mid-20th century to the mid-1970s.
Subsequently, from the mid-1970s to 1991, the Soviet Union supported the
Ethiopian military regime headed by Mengistu Haile Mariam, which brought
untold misery, war, famine, and terrorism to various population groups in
Ethiopia. The financing provided from these external resources enabled succes-
sive Ethiopian states to engage in terrorism.
When the military regime collapsed in 1991, the United States financed
the Tigrayan organization, the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF),
which emerged from the Tigrayan ethnonational group, and diplomatically
assisted Meles Zenawi to replace Mengistu Haile Mariam. The successive
regimes of Menelik, Haile Selassie, Mengistu, and Meles have been racist and
dictatorial and have continuously pursued destructive policies that have inten-
sified war, terrorism, underdevelopment, and poverty and have denied the
people subsistence, protection, and development (Shiffman, 1995). Con-
sequently, the people do not have adequate income, food and habitable homes,
or access to health and medical services. Moreover, they have no protection
from political violence, because the Ethiopian state engages in massive human
rights violations and terrorism (Jalata, 2000).
As with the previous states, the current Ethiopian state mainly obtains
its political legitimacy from global connections. In addition to financing with
Israel the flight of Mengistu in 1991, the United States supported the creation
of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) by the
Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and endorsed the emergence of the
Meles regime. Along with other western countries, the United States still
provides significant assistance to the regime. Human Rights Watch/World Report
1999 (1999: 3) states:
With about $30 million in development aid and $66 million in food aid, bringing
the total to about $97 million, Ethiopia remained the second largest recipient
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of US aid in sub-Saharan Africa, after South Africa. The US failed to use its
privileged relations with Ethiopia as a leverage for human rights improvements.
US foreign policymakers support regimes like that of Ethiopia in the perceived
strategic and economic self-interest of the United States and have no interest in
developing a more critical understanding of the political context in which they
have become involved.
Currently, the main rationale for the involvement of US policymakers
with regard to Ethiopia is to maintain political order and to enlist it in the fight
against global terrorism. Ironically, the US government cannot effectively deal
with global terrorism because it practices a double standard: It condones the
terrorism of friendly states such as that of Ethiopia and Israel while simul-
taneously complaining about other forms of terrorism. US foreign-policy
experts are more concerned with political order, economic reforms, and exist-
ence of regimes such as that of Ethiopia at any cost and care less about democ-
racy and human rights. The Economist (1997: 36) notes that Meles Zenawi:
is regarded as one of Africa’s ‘new leaders’: he recently won an award in the
United States for good government . . . Their [western] governments tend to
give priority to the Prime Minister’s economic reforms rather than his record
on human rights.
The intensification of globalization through various technological and
information revolutions has not changed the underlying status of colonized
peoples like the Oromo. Rather, it has increased their exploitation and repres-
sion by enabling the regime in power to use the Internet and other communi-
cation and information networks to keep the Oromo under ‘Ethiopian political
slavery’ and to ally the Ethiopian state with transnational capital. The Oromo
and others are denied the freedom of self-expression and self-development and
are forced to provide their economic and labor resources to the Ethiopian
colonizers and their supporters and to live under deplorable conditions. Using
political violence, the Tigrayan authoritarian-terrorist regime has dominated
and controlled the Oromo and denied them the freedom of expression, associ-
ation, and organization, as well as access to the media and related forms of
communication and information networks. The Meles regime has used various
techniques of violence to terrorize colonized peoples like the Oromo. Former
prisoners have testified to incidents of being whipped or tortured, being locked
in steel barrels, and being forced into pits where fire was made on top of them;
others have reported that large containers or bottles filled with water were fixed
to their testicles, or if they were women, bottles or poles were pushed into their
vaginas (Fossati et al., 1996). TPLF/EPRDF soldiers have openly shot thousands
of people in rural Oromia – leaving their bodies for hyenas, burying them in
mass graves, or throwing their corpses off cliffs.
Other methods of killing include burning, bombing, cutting throats or
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arteries in the neck, strangulation, and burying people up to their necks in the
ground. Hassen (2001) estimates that between 1992 and 2001 about 50,000
killings and 16,000 disappearances (euphemism for secret killings) took place in
Oromia alone. Further, he estimates that 90 percent of the killings are not
reported. To hide these criminal practices from the world community, the Meles
government ‘does not keep written records of its extrajudicial executions and
the prolonged detention of political prisoners’ (quoted in Hassen, 2001: 33). The
Meles regime has killed Oromo who engaged in peaceful demonstrations. For
instance, on 25 March 1992, in the town of Watar, Hararghe, the soldiers of the
regime massacred 92 Oromo and wounded more than 300.
Hassan Ali, an Oromo collaborator with the Meles regime who subse-
quently fled and resettled in the United States, describes the criminal activities
of the soldiers as follows:
The TPLF soldiers and its members are a law unto themselves. Only what they
say and what they want is implemented in Oromia to the general exclusion of
Oromo interests or wishes . . . Although Oromia is autonomous in name, the
government soldiers and secret service agents have total power to do whatever
they want in Oromia. They imprison, torture, or kill anyone . . . without any due
process of law. They have established several secret detention centers, where
thousands of innocent people are kept for years without trial or charge. (quoted
in Hassen, 2001: 33)
TPLF/EPRDF soldiers have killed several pregnant women and hundreds of
Oromo children between the ages of 12 and 16. According to the Oromia
Support Group (1997: 8):
a 7-month pregnant woman in Robe, Bale, was arrested and beaten . . . She
miscarried and later died in custody. When relatives went to claim her body,
they were told to replace the remains with a living relative. When asked to
explain, the TPLF soldiers said, ‘She died with OLF objectives still stuck in her
brain and we could not get what we wanted from her.’
The Ethiopian government has used state terrorism to commit genocide on the
Oromo and other indigenous peoples.
Article II of the United Nations Convention (1948) defines genocide as
‘acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical,
racial or religious group.’ Chalk and Jonassohn identify two major types of
genocide (1990): the first type is used to colonize and maintain an empire by
actually terrorizing people perceived to be real or potential enemies. In this
case, the main purpose of practicing genocide is to acquire land and other
valuable resources. The second type of genocide, ideological genocide, involves
the maintenance of colonial domination by state elites through the establish-
ment of hegemony practiced through genocidal massacres to prevent the resist-
ance of the dominated groups. Jonassohn (1998: 23) notes that ideological
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genocide develops ‘in nation-states where ethnic groups develop chauvinistic
ideas about their superiority and exclusiveness.’
As the Amhara-dominated successive regimes engaged in terrorism and
genocide and exploited the resources of the Oromo, Afar, Ogaden-Somali,
Sidama and Walayita, the Tigrayan-dominated regime is engaged in similar prac-
tices to suppress the national movements of these indigenous peoples in order
to continue their domination and exploitation. With the intensification of the
national movements of the Oromo, Sidama, Afar, and Annuak, the Tigrayan-
dominated regime has been engaged in massive human rights violations, terror-
ism, and genocide. The Meles regime has been using war, torture, rape, and other
mechanisms of violence to fulfill its political objectives. While engaging in politi-
cal violence in the form of state terrorism, state rape, and hidden genocide to
control the Oromo people and others and loot their economic resources, the
Tigrayan state elites claim that they are promoting democracy, federalism, and
national self-determination. The Meles regime believes that Oromo intellec-
tuals, businessmen and women, and community and religious leaders are the
enemy of the ‘Ethiopian revolution.’ In its propaganda pamphlet known as
Hizbawi Adera (1996/1997), the regime claims that Oromo leaders have endan-
gered the processes of peace, democracy, and development by promoting what
it calls narrow nationalism. Sagalee Haara (1998: 6) notes that ‘recent murders
and disappearances of Oromo and the detention of members of the
Macha/Tulama Association and the Human Rights League are part of the imple-
mentation of policies put forward in this document.’
When it attempts to eliminate the Oromo elite through hidden genocide
to deny the Oromo a leadership, this racist regime prepares the Tigrayan
children for the position of leadership by providing better education while
denying an appropriate educational opportunity for the Oromo children.3
Hundreds of Oromo business people have been harassed, killed, or imprisoned
and robbed of their properties. Similarly, hundreds of Oromo intellectuals have
been harassed or killed or forced into exile. The regime expelled more than 300
Oromo students from the Addis Ababa University and other colleges and
imprisoned or killed their leaders for peacefully demonstrating on 21 January
2004. Saman Zia-Zarifi (2004: 1), the academic freedom director at Human
Rights Watch, says, ‘Shooting at unarmed students is a shameful misuse of
government power.’
Despite its adoption in its constitution, the principles of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and International Covenants on Human Rights,
the Meles government engages in terrorism and gross human rights violations.
The TPLF/EPRDF government accepts state violence against Oromo, Sidama,
Annuak, Somali, and others as a legitimate means of establishing political
stability and order. Welsh (2002: 67–8) suggests that since weak states ‘lack the
capacity to meet the demands and rights of citizens and improve the standard of
living for the majority of population,’ they engage in political violence and in
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genocidal massacres to suppress the population groups that struggle for political
and economic rights. Because of their economic resources, the size of their popu-
lation, and their resistance in challenging the racist policy of this regime, the
Oromo are targeted for destruction. As Sharlach (2002: 107) attests, genocide
occurs when a politically ‘dominant group, frightened by what its members
perceive as an onslaught of international and internal movements for democracy
and socioeconomic change, harnesses the state apparatus to destroy the
subordinate group altogether.’ The Meles government sees Oromia as part of its
empire, controls all Oromian resources, and practices terrorism and genocide
against the Oromo people since it perceives them as its potential or real enemies.
The Tigrayan elites are imposing their political ideologies, such as ‘revo-
lutionary democracy’ and ‘federalism,’ to legitimate Tigrayan ethnocracy and
state power through genocidal massacres to control the Oromo and other popu-
lation groups and their resources by eliminating their leadership. The regime has
been hiding its genocidal practices and terrorist activities. Jonassohn’s (1998: 11)
description of the conspiracy of ‘collective denial’ of genocide by perpetrators
captures this reality:
There are many reasons for this: (a) in many societies such materials are not
written down, or are destroyed rather than preserved in archives; (b) many
perpetrators have recourse to elaborate means of hiding the truth, controlling
access to information, and spreading carefully contrived disinformation; and (c)
historically, most genocides were not reported because . . . there appears to
have existed a sort of conspiracy of ‘collective denial’ whereby the disappear-
ance of a people did not seem to require comment or even mention.
The government of Ethiopia committed genocide on the Annuak people of
Gambella in December 2003 and 2004. In the letter it sent to Prime Minster
Meles Zenawi on 8 January 2004, the International Campaign to End Genocide
notes that massacring people:
because of their ethnic group membership is genocidal. The Genocidal Conven-
tion outlaws the intentional destruction of part of an ethnic group, not just the
destruction of the whole group . . . We ask that you now arrest and try the
perpetrators of the December massacre of Annuak in Gambella.
State-sanctioned rape is a form of terrorism in Ethiopia. The use of
sexual violence is a tactic of genocide that a dominant ethnonational group prac-
tices in destroying the subordinate ethnonational group (Sharlach, 2002).
Genocide studies ignore:
the full extent of the humiliation of the ethnic group through the rape of its
women, the symbols of honor and vessels of culture. When a woman’s honor is
tarnished through illicit intercourse, even if against her will, the ethnic group is
also dishonored. The after effects of rape, forced impregnation, psychological
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trauma, degradation, and demoralization go beyond the rape victims them-
selves. (Sharlach, 2002: 107)
The Tigrayan cadres, soldiers, and officials frequently rape Oromo girls and
women to demoralize the Oromo and show that the Tigrayan rulers wield
boundless power. Many of the rape survivors have contracted diseases, such as
syphilis, gonorrhea, and AIDS. MacKinnon’s (1994: 11–12) comment regarding
ethnic cleansing in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina applies equally to the rape
of Oromo women: ‘It is rape to drive a wedge through a community, to shatter
a society, to destroy a people. It is rape as genocide.’
The Tigrayan regime has targeted all sectors of Oromo society to
destroy the foundation of Oromo nationalism and political struggle. In Ethiopia,
where neither freedom of expression nor free media exist, people choose to be
quiet to save their lives even if their relatives are killed by the government. The
Ethiopian state elites who have been engaged in gross human rights violations
and genocide like other criminal leaders in peripheral countries:
not only go unpunished, they are even rewarded. On the international scene
they are accorded all the respect and courtesies due to government officials.
They are treated in accordance with diplomatic protocol in negotiations and
seated in the General Assembly of the United Nations. When they are finally
ousted from their offices, they are offered asylum by countries that lack respect
for international law, but have a great deal of respect for the ill-gotten wealth
that such perpetrators bring with them. (Jonassohn, 1998: 24)
The Tigrayan-dominated regime banned independent Oromo organiz-
ations, including the Oromo Liberation Front, in 1992, and declared war on
these organizations and the Oromo people. It even outlawed musical groups and
professional associations and closed down Oromo newspapers. Attempting to
make the Oromo voiceless, as previous Ethiopian governments have done, the
Meles government has left Oromo without any form of organization and insti-
tution. Only the organizations and the media that are owned and controlled by
the Tigrayan government have remained intact, serving to impose the Tigrayan
colonial and racist authority in Oromia and other colonized regions. The regime
has engaged in political crimes, genocidal massacres, and state terrorism with
little or no opposition from western powers, particularly the United States. How
long will international bodies continue to ignore these problems? Are they
waiting for a full genocide to emerge? Let us now turn to Sudan and examine
the connection between racism, Islamism and state terrorism.
Racism, Islamism, and State Terrorism in Sudan
The modern Sudanese state was created through the broadening of the
European-dominated racialized capitalist world system via British colonization.
90 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE SOCIOLOGY
05_jalata_054471 (jk-t)  17/6/05  11:48 am  Page 90
Since the transfer of state power to the Arabized northern Sudanese elites in
1956, northern Sudanese elites have practiced slavery, colonialism, and
continued subjugation on various Sudanese population groups. In these prac-
tices, racism and Islamism have been used as twin ideologies. Before the coloniz-
ation of Sudan by Britain, the Turko-Egyptian conquest laid the foundation for
a central state in northern Sudan. A northern Sudanese movement known as
the Madia dismantled the Turko-Egyptian rule and ruled northern Sudan until
Britain colonized Sudan. Madism ‘was both a religious and a political movement
which aimed at a return to the Orthodox Islamic constitution in government,
culture, and religion’ (El Mahdi, 1965: 19).
Northern Sudanese elites enslaved population groups that they
considered unbelievers and racially and culturally inferior; they used the sword
and the Koran to commodify human beings. They burned houses and destroyed
communities to hunt and enslave the southern and other Sudanese. Arab slave
traders from northern Sudan and other countries settled in the south and other
places and intensified the slave trade and social destruction with the help of the
state. According to Fluehr-Lobban (1991: 73), ‘slavery was conducted for both
military and commercial purposes. The Turko-Egyptian armies depended on
regular slave raiding, and the demand for domestic slaves in Egypt, the Ottoman
Empire, and Arabia was continuous.’ More than 2 million people were sold
during the 19th century (O’Ballance, 1977: 20). Northern Sudanese
merchants went south demanding huge deliveries of slaves, ivory and feathers
and in doing so devastated the area, burning villages and farms, encouraging
[inter-ethnonational] wars so that one [ethnonation] made deliveries at the
expense of the other. This situation which lasted for . . . [more than] 50 years
made stable life and progress impossible in the south. (Garang, 1985: 23)
Slavery created long-lasting historical contradictions in Sudan. Fluehr-
Lobban (1991: 72) argues that:
the complex role that the nineteenth-century slave trade played in laying the
foundation for the fear of the foreigner and the trader from the north, together
with a belief that the trader was Muslim and condoned by Islam, laid the basis
and set the agenda for north-south suspicions and divisions that have continued
to define relations from the nineteenth century to present.
Prior to the colonization of Sudan by Britain, the northern Sudanese elites could
not effectively occupy the south (Holt and Daly, 1979); however, they sometimes
raided it (Woodward, 1994). O’Ballance (1977: 24) notes that ‘wherever possible
the Mahdi attempted to force the Islamic religion on the southerners, which
caused hostility, and also legalized slavery.’ During the Turko-Egyptian and
Mahdist regimes, ‘social progress was arrested in the south, for the same reasons
trade flourished in the north, towns appeared along the Nile, and on the Red
Sea. This was the beginning of uneven development between the two parts of
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the country’ (Garang, 1985: 22). Further, the Anglo-Egyptian condominium that
ruled Sudan from 1899 to 1956 widened the inequality between the north and
the south.
Although the British administration abolished slavery, its policies
favored the north and expanded colonial capitalist development in that region.
In the south and other places, development issues were largely ignored. For
instance, there were only five university graduates and one secondary school in
the south when Sudan gained its independence in 1956 (Garang, 1985). Thus the
southern and other Sudanese were not only economically exploited but denied
education by the British. When Britain was forced to leave Sudan by anti-
colonial forces, the south and other regions came under the control of the north,
and the south’s demand for a federation was ignored and a unitary state was
imposed. According to Garang (1985: 23–4):
The British official in the south was replaced by a northern official because
Britain had not trained southerners for the job. The southern market fell to
northern merchants who bought food and other crops cheaply from the south-
erners and [in return] sold them expensive European goods.
The system of southern education was changed; Arabic became the official
language, and the north practically occupied state power (O’Ballance, 1977).
Although decolonization ‘itself resulted from an act of the Constituent
Assembly, freely and fairly elected in 1953 by any reasonable standard’
(Bechtold, 1991: 3), the new Sudanese government ‘sought to impose Arabiza-
tion and Islamization on the south in an attempt to achieve national unity
through uniformity’ (Deng, 1991: 25).
The southern Sudanese resisted both Turko-Egyptian and northern
Sudanese colonialism in the 19th century. They fiercely resisted the Madist army
and forced it to withdraw from the south in 1897 (O’Ballance, 1977). Similarly,
they opposed British colonialism and its policy of creating a hereditary chief.
Numerous revolts occurred during the first half of the 20th century. In the early
1920s, the south began to create protonationalist organizations, such as the
Sudanese United Tribes Society and the White Flag League. The south also
continued its resistance to northern domination after the modern Sudanese
state emerged. Nevertheless, northern politicians ignored the interests of the
south and other regions. O’Ballance (1977: 40) states that:
the increasing pace of Sudanization (which to the southerner means north-
ernization) caused unrest and discontent in the south . . . To the southerners it
appeared as if they were being colonized for the second time. Both the army
and the police in the south . . . were now heavily officered by northerners.
Grievances such as increasing the number of northern troops in the south and
the attempt to transfer southern soldiers to the north led to mutiny. Deng (1991:
24) comments that:
92 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE SOCIOLOGY
05_jalata_054471 (jk-t)  17/6/05  11:48 am  Page 92
the conflict erupted in August 1955 when a mutiny by one southern battalion
was triggered by a widely shared fear in the south that independence was going
to mean a change of masters – from the British to the Arabs – and could entail
the return of the slave trade in which blacks were the victims of the Arab north.
The mutineers, who escaped imprisonment and execution by fleeing into the
forest, began to initiate guerrilla warfare against the Sudanese state. The
continued state repression of the south and indiscriminate killings of civilians
for allegedly harboring the guerrilla fighters facilitated the development of
southern nationalism. To curb that impulse, the state intensified its Arabization
and Islamization policies: it nationalized private schools, prohibited missionary
schools in 1957, and, in 1960, replaced the Sunday weekly holiday with Muslim
Friday.
With the emergence of a resistance movement and a continuation of the
demand for independence or federation, the state increased its political terror-
ism on the south. Because of brutal repression, many government employees
and soldiers deserted the government and joined a movement known as the
Anya-Nya. In 1971 the Anya-Nya became the Southern Sudan Liberation
Movement (SSLM). This organization reached a negotiated political settlement
with the Numayri government in 1972. The south accepted regional autonomy
set forth in the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement and abandoned its demand for
a separate army. In 1983, President Numaryi changed his mind and introduced
the rule of sharia, or Islamic law. Numaryi divided the south into three regions
thus violating the 1972 Addis Ababa Peace Agreement.
Consequently, the second phase of the struggle of the south started
under the leadership of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and
its military unit, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). As the resistance
increased, the south was exposed to mass poverty, economic and cultural dislo-
cation, unemployment, recurring famine and disaster, war, and state terrorism.
This political terrorism manifested itself in the form of summary executions,
assassinations, mass imprisonments, rape, forced dislocation into concentration
camps, constant destruction of houses, farms, and villages, robbery and theft, and
militarization of rural communities (Amnesty International, 1995/96; Prender-
gast and Bickel, 1994; Walgren, 1994). Today, the Sudanese government
continues to use state terrorism and famine to crush the resistance struggles of
southern and western Sudan. According to Prendergast (2004a: 1):
the government’s helicopter gunships are blowing bombs and bullets into
southern villages, while the opposition Sudan People’s Liberation Army
conducts ground raids on the oil industry infrastructure that helps pay for the
state’s helicopters. Relief agencies, banned from many areas by the government,
are begging for access to deliver food aid to a million people dependent on them
for survival. More bodies are added to the shocking two million victims of
violence and famine in Sudan’s 19-year civil war.
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The conflict between northern and southern Sudanese displaced 4.5
million people, compounded the famine crises, and increased the suffering and
misery of the victims (Prendergast, 2004a). The conflict has been:
between the central government, dominated by a well-armed and well-funded
Arab Islamist elite, and southern insurgents opposed to the regime. Sudan’s vast
oil reserves, currently controlled by the government, are the greatest spoils of
the war, but it is also a battle over land, religion, ideology and demands for self-
determination. (Prendergast, 2004a: 1)
The conflict in Sudan sometimes goes beyond the south and north and religion
and identity. This conflict also has taken place among Muslims, not simply
between Christians and Muslims, since ‘a small group from the center of the
country maintains power by any means necessary’ (Prendergast, 2004b: 1). The
peoples of west Sudan who are currently facing state terrorism and genocide are
Muslims, although they are not Arabized Muslims.
Prendergast (2004b: 1) notes that ‘Sudan is Rwanda in slow motion.’ The
Sudanese state created ‘the second largest death toll since World War II (the
conflict with the SPLA),’ and it ‘is responsible for creating the worst humani-
tarian crisis in . . . Darfur’ in 2003 and 2004. When two Darfurian rebel groups
in western Sudan, namely, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and
the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), attacked military garrisons in
western Sudan in February 2003, the government mobilized, armed, and
unleashed a terrorist militia group known as ‘Janjaweed’ (Arab militia) to
collectively punish the peoples of the Fur, Zaghawa, and Massalit. As of 19
November 2004, public television reports from the United States estimate that
about 70,000 people have been killed by Janjaweed militia and state soldiers in
west Sudan. According to Mozersky (2004: 1), these militia attacks have
produced untold human atrocities:
Part of a scorched-earth government offensive, Janjaweed attacks have led to
massive displacement, indiscriminate killings, looting and mass rape. These have
been characterized as ethnic cleansing by many observers and compared to the
Rwandan genocide by the former head of the United Nations in Sudan.
To date, more than one million residents of Darfur have been
displaced, many now living in squalid camps, where they are dying from disease
and malnutrition. Another 110,000 have crossed into neighbouring Chad,
though even there they are not safe from Janjaweed attacks.
The Arabized Sudanese state has been using state terrorism to resolve
the political, social, and economic crises in Sudan. This state receives political
and financial support from Arab countries (Oxford Analytica, 2004).
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Comparing the Two Cases
State terrorism is associated with the issues of control of territory and resources
and the construction of political and ideological domination. Oliverio (1997: 52)
explains two essential features of state terrorism:
First, the state reinforces the use of violence as a viable, effective, mitigating
factor for managing conflict; second, such a view is reinforced by culturally
constructed and socially organized processes, expressed through symbolic
forms, and related in complex ways to present social interests. Within increas-
ing economic and environmental globalization, gender politics, and the resur-
gence of nationalities within territorial boundaries, the discourse of terrorism,
as a practice of statecraft, is crucial to the construction of political boundaries.
As such, terrorism is invoked in the art of statecraft when multiple, often
conflicting versions of the past are produced and, at particular historical
moments, become sites of intense struggles.
Ethiopian and Sudanese state elites have been determined to maintain existing
political and economic order by investing meager available resources in building
unproductive institutions, such as the army, security infrastructure, and bureau-
cracy, and using them in imposing state terrorism on their subjects in Ethiopia
and Sudan, respectively. The behavior of these elites has been shaped by preda-
tory political cultures that have been tyrannical, racist, and parasitic. Conse-
quently, political elites in the two countries have failed to advance peaceful and
meaningful socioeconomic development, to resolve fundamental contradictions
between the dominant and the dominated ethnonational groups, and to recog-
nize principles of self-determination and multinational democracy. Rather, they
have chosen state terrorism to promote their political objectives.
As Christians, Habashas have been enjoying the sympathy and support
of the West, while the northern Sudanese Muslims have been receiving assist-
ance from Muslim states. Consequently, both states have ignored domestic
political legitimacy. The identification of the Sudanese government with the
Arab world rather than with Africa has strengthened the relationship of this
state with the Arab states. For many decades, ‘the Arab states have been an
important source of economic, military, and political assistance. Such assistance
has been especially helpful to Sudan’s governments when they have been inter-
nationally beleaguered or under pressure in the country’s long-running civil
war’ (Oxford Analytica, 2004: 1). Of all Arab countries, Egypt has the greatest
strategic and economic interest in Sudan because of its reliance on the Nile,
which originates in Sudan. Following Egypt, Libya and Saudi Arabia have the
second greatest interest in Sudan:
For Libya, Sudan constitutes a potential ally in its on-off rivalry with Egypt.
Otherwise its principal interest in Sudan is, as for Saudi Arabia, that the country
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should not be a political threat. Libya and Saudi Arabia therefore share with
Egypt a preference for Sudan to be ruled by a stable military regime, rather
than a democratic government or, worst of all, a revolutionary Islamist regime
such as ruled Sudan in the 1990s and which supported Islamist opposition
groups in the region. (Oxford Analytica, 2004: 2)
While Sudan is strategically important for some Arab countries,
Ethiopia is strategically significant for western countries in general and for the
United States in particular. Therefore, these western countries are more inter-
ested in supporting regimes that they can easily maneuver rather than demo-
cratic governments that have domestic legitimacy and can resist external
dependency (Jalata, 2001). The Meles regime is in power predominantly because
it receives financial and military support from the United States and other
western countries. For example, Impact International (1997: 1) notes that the US
government:
agreed in July 1996 to supply Ethiopia 50 fighter aircrafts and a number of heli-
copter gun ships. After signing the agreement, a Pentagon spokesman described
Prime Minister Meles Zenawi as [a] ‘trusted and important friend of America
. . . the Ethiopian leader was the only one in the region’ whom they could
depend upon to counter the menace of fundamentalism.
The United States, other western countries, and Israel use the discourse of
Islamic fundamentalism to support the authoritarian-terrorist regime of Meles
Zenaw and to suppress the national struggles of Oromo and others for self-
determination and multinational democracy (Africa Confidential, 1997; Jalata,
2001). The regional and international supporters of these states have directly or
indirectly contributed to serious human tragedies that have significant conse-
quences for the Horn of Africa. Although global powers are concerned about
the political crisis in Sudan because they oppose the Islamist Sudanese regime,
they rarely show any concern about state terrorism in Ethiopia.
As President Numaryi adopted the rhetoric of socialism and regional
autonomy and established a temporary peace with the south between 1972 and
1983, the Meles regime established a coalition transitional government with the
Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and other political organizations between 1991
and 1992. Although Numaryi won the confidence of the south during this period
and established consensual domination (Gramsci, 1971) over the south, he
returned to coercive domination by reintroducing the policy of Islamization and
terrorism in 1983. According to Fluehr-Lobban (1991: 71), ‘Sudan has offered
one of the more provocative cases of state-supported Islamization in recent
years because of the government’s swiftness and readiness to apply the hudad
punishment after sharia was decreed to be national law in September 1983.’
Similarly, the Meles regime soon disbanded the coalition transitional govern-
ment after it consolidated the Tigrayan-based government and started state
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terrorism as previous Ethiopian regimes. Since this regime emerged from the
Tigrayan numerical minority group (estimated at 3.5 million), its terrorism has
mainly targeted the Oromo numerical majority (estimated at 35 million),
because the Oromo have challenged the Ethiopian racial and ethnic hierarchy
and Meles’s fake democracy and federalism.
As the Sudanese state currently uses the policies of racism, Islamism,
and state terrorism in its attempt to destroy the national movements of the
indigenous Africans, the Tigrayan-led Ethiopian regime uses racism and state
terrorism to suppress the national movements of the Oromo, Ogaden-Somali,
Sidama and others while preaching the rhetoric of ‘democracy,’ ‘federation,’ and
‘self-determination’ to establish the hegemony of the Tigrayan ethnocracy.
Ethiopia and Sudan are two of 13 countries in the world that face the threat of
genocide; the remaining countries are Iraq, Afghanistan, Myanmar, Burundi,
Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, Uganda, Algeria, China
and Pakistan (Genocide Alert, 2004).
Conclusion
In Ethiopia and Sudan, state elites have failed in their policies of domination
and thus have faced resistance from subjugated ethnonational groups and other
sectors. State terrorism and other forms of political repression have intensified
crises in these two countries. Global powers that support the authoritarian-
terrorist regime of Ethiopia oppose the Islamist-terrorist regime of Sudan. The
inclination of the Sudanese state to promote Islamic fundamentalism is turning
the West against the country. This creates international conditions favorable for
the SPLM of the south, and for the SLA and the JEM of west Sudan. This is
clearly not the case for the OLF and other liberation movements in Ethiopia.
Further, both radical and moderate Arabs are still more comfortable with their
Christian Habasha cousins than with indigenous African groups, even though
some Oromo are Muslims. As Arab states ignore non-Arabized Muslim
Africans in Sudan and Ethiopia, the Christian West ignores the suffering of
Christian Oromo and other Christians by siding with Habashas. Neither
Christianity nor Islam necessarily helps indigenous Africans to have global or
regional connections because of racism; only some southern Sudanese are bene-
fiting from such connections. In their opposition to the Islamist Sudanese state,
Europe and North America support the SPLM; they also sympathize with the
organizations of western Sudan for political expediency, although they are
Muslims.
As the Soviet Union was committed to help the Mengistu regime, the
West, particularly the United States, along with some Arab countries, is
committed to keeping the Meles regime in power in Ethiopia. The policies of
the West have become major obstacles for the struggle for self-determination
and democracy in Ethiopia. Similarly, the policies of Arab states have hindered
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to some degree the struggles of south and west Sudan. It is paradoxical that the
policies of the West that support the struggle for self-determination in southern
and western Sudan ignore the consequences of state terrorism and massive
human rights violations in Ethiopia.
Without accountable, democratic, and legitimate governments both in
Ethiopia and Sudan, various population groups in these countries may soon face
dangerous conditions similar to Bosnia, Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia, and
Somalia. If the current Ethiopian state terrorism and massive human rights
violations are tolerated by countries that support the Ethiopian government and
by international organizations that finance the Ethiopian government – such as
the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the United Nations – a
disaster is imminent in Ethiopia. The current intervention of the West in the
crisis of Sudan may avert the emerging disaster there if western leaders are
serious about implementing self-determination and a multicultural or multi-
national democracy in that country. Regional and global powers, nongovern-
mental organizations, human rights organizations, responsible and progressive
faith communities, and democratic individuals and groups have a political and
moral responsibility to expose and fight racism, state terrorism, religious perse-
cution, genocide, and other forms of human rights violations both in Ethiopia
and Sudan.
Notes
1. The Gada system has the principles of checks and balances (such as periodic
transference of power every eight years and division of power among execu-
tive, legislative, and judiciary branches), balanced opposition (among five
parties), and power sharing between higher and lower administrative organs to
prevent power from falling into the hands of despots (Legesse, 2000: 2).
2. Historically, Europeans have considered Habashas as a very intelligent people
because of their racial affinity with the ‘Caucasian race’ (Marcus, 1996: 5) and
as ‘racial and cultural middleman’ between black Africa on one side and Europe
and the Middle East on the other (Marcus, 1996: 7).
3. According to Hassen (2001: 42):
Only fractions of the Oromo are educated . . . By 1995, according to
government sources, enrollment was only 20 percent for primary and
12 percent for secondary schools respectively . . . Out of an estimated
population of thirty million in Oromia 0.1 percent received the third
level education in 1994 . . . By 2002, all secondary school students in
Oromia will graduate from 10th grade instead of the usual 12th grade.
Oromo students start learning English in the seventh grade and they
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take [high] school leaving exams in English in tenth grade. Students in
Tigray start learning English in second grade and they take [high]
school leaving exams in English in 12th grade. They have a better
chance of passing [high] school leaving examinations than Oromo
students. This means that the Oromo students will not have any more
opportunity for college and university level education. Only students
in the privileged state of Tigray will have that opportunity in the future.
The TPLF dominated regime is deliberately leaving behind Oromo
children from the mainstream modern education.
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